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Abstract: There is, on a given moral view, a constraint against performing acts of a certain type if 
that view prohibits agents from performing an instance of that act-type even to prevent two or 
more others from each performing a morally comparable instance of that act-type. The fact that 
commonsense morality includes many such constraints has been seen by several philosophers as a 
decisive objection against act-consequentialism. Despite this, I argue that constraints are more 
plausibly accommodated within an act-consequentialist framework than within the more standard 
side-constraint framework. For I argue that when we combine agent-relative act-consequentialism 
with a Kantian theory of value, we arrive at a version of consequentialism, which I call 
Kantsequentialism, that has several advantages over the standard side-constraint approach to 
accommodating constraints. What’s more, I argue that Kantsequentialism doesn’t have any of the 
disadvantages that critics of consequentializing have presumed that such a theory must have. 
 
1. Constraints 
There is, on a given moral view, a constraint against performing acts of a certain type if that 
view prohibits agents from performing an instance of that act-type even to prevent two or more 
others from each performing a morally comparable instance of that act-type.1 Thus, there is, on 
                                                      
1 As Scheffler puts it, “an agent-centred restriction [or constraint] is, roughly, a restriction which it is at least 
sometimes impermissible to violate in circumstances where a violation would serve to minimize total overall 
violations of the very same restriction, and would have no other morally relevant consequences” (1985, 409). Note, 
then, that a constraint is not simply a prohibition against performing an act of a certain type even to prevent two or 
more others from each performing an instance of that act type. After all, classical utilitarianism would prohibit you 
from failing to maximize utility even to prevent two others from each failing to maximize utility. But, in any such 
case, your act couldn’t be morally comparable to those of the other two. For your act would fail to maximize utility 
only if it resulted in a net loss of utility that’s greater than the combined net loss resulting from those of the other two. 
So, despite what some have claimed (e.g., Ridge 2009, 422), classical utilitarianism doesn’t imply that there is a 
constraint against failing to maximize utility or any other type of act, for it doesn’t prohibit you from performing an 
act-type even to prevent two others from each performing a morally comparable instance of that act-type.    
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commonsense morality, a constraint against breaking a promise given that it prohibits agents 
from breaking a promise even to prevent two others from each breaking a morally comparable 
promise. The fact that commonsense morality includes such a constraint shows that it doesn’t 
simply take promise-breakings to be something bad that agents should, other things being 
equal, minimize. Additionally, commonsense morality must hold either that agents are 
prohibited from breaking a promise in the pursuit of their ends or that agents are required both 
to have the end of minimizing their own promise-breakings and t0 give this end priority over 
that of minimizing promise-breakings overall.2    
I’ll argue that it’s the latter. For I’ll argue that it has at least three advantages and no 
disadvantages. Admittedly some philosophers have argued that it has several disadvantages, 
but I’ll show that they’re mistaken. For, as I’ll show, we can adopt the latter by combining 
agent-relative act-consequentialism with a Kantian theory of value, and, when we do, we avoid 
these putative disadvantages while holding on to all the advantages. Thus, if my arguments 
succeed, they’ll demonstrate that constraints are more plausibly accommodated within an act-
consequentialist framework.   
 
2. Two Opposing Approaches to Accommodating Constraints  
As we’ve just seen, there are two competing approaches to accommodating constraints. One 
approach is to include an outright restriction on the types of acts that agents are permitted to 
perform in the pursuit of their ends. And the other approach is to give agents the agent-relative 
end of minimizing their own performances of certain types of acts and to give this end priority 
over the agent-neutral one of minimizing overall performances of that act-type. The former is 
                                                      
2 There’s a third possibility: agents are required both to have the end of minimizing promise-breakings-committed-
in-order-to-prevent-other-promise-breakings and t0 give this end priority over that of minimizing promise-breakings 
overall—see Setiya (2018, 97–99) and Dougherty (2013, 531). Since I, like some others (e.g., Howard 2021, 741), find 
this deeply implausible, I’ll ignore it in the remainder. Indeed, it seems especially implausible given that, as even 
Setiya (2018, 96) suggests, each of us ought to prefer that it is, other things being equal, someone else rather than 
ourself who fails to keep a promise. And see Cox and Hammerton (Forthcoming) for a related worry. Lastly, we’ll see 
in section 4 below that the sort of view that Setiya and Dougherty propose yields counterintuitive moral verdicts in 
what are known as intra-agent minimizing cases.   
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what I’ll call the side-constraint approach, and the latter is what I’ll call the teleological approach. The 
key difference is that whereas the teleological approach allows that an agent’s other legitimate 
ends could—at least, in principle—affect the permissibility of their infringing upon a constraint, 
the side-constraint approach doesn’t. Note, then, that any theorist who accepts that there are 
constraints must be either a teleologist or a side-constraint theorist. For any theorist who accepts 
that there is a constraint against, say, φ-ing must either accept or deny that, in determining 
whether φ-ing is permissible, not φ-ing is an end that must be weighed against the opportunity 
for achieving other ends by φ-ing. If they accept this, they’re a teleologist. And if they deny this 
and, so, accommodate the constraint against φ-ing by holding that agents are prohibited from 
φ-ing for the sake of any end, then they’re a side-constraint theorist. Also, I should note that, 
like Judith Jarvis Thomson, I’ll distinguish between merely infringing upon a constraint and 
violating a constraint. A subject infringes upon a constraint against their performing a given act-
type if and only if they perform an instance of that act-type. By contrast, a subject violates that 
constraint if and only if they not only infringe upon it but also act wrongly in doing so 
(Thomson 1986, 51). Thus, not all infringements are wrong, but th0se that are wrong are called 
violations. 
 2.1 The Side-Constraint Approach: The side-constraint approach originates with Robert 
Nozick (1974). On this approach, constraints are side-constraints, which impose absolute limits 
on how agents may treat others. They do so by restricting the types of acts that agents may 
permissibly perform in the pursuit of their ends (Nozick 1974, 29). And this holds even if their 
end is to minimize their own performances of that act-type. Indeed, side-constraints prohibit 
agents from infringing upon them for the sake of any end. And they function this way because 
of their rationale: the “Kantian principle that individuals…may not be sacrificed or used for the 
achieving of other ends without their consent” (Nozick 1974, 30–32).  
Side-constraints serve to protect those entities that have what Kant calls dignity, which is 
a kind of value that’s “above all price” (G 4:434–435).3 Side-constraints do this by imposing 
strict limits on what agents may morally (and rationally) do to beings with dignity in the 
                                                      
3 The ‘G’ stands for Kant’s Groundwork, and the citation is given by volume and page number. 
 4 
pursuit of their ends. This entails that certain act-types are never permissible, but it doesn’t 
entail that these act-types are always impermissible.4 After all, certain morally catastrophic 
situations may simply be beyond morality in that morality has nothing to say about what’s 
permissible and impermissible in such circumstances (Williams 1973, 92–93).5 But the side-
constraint view, as I understand it, entails that, in any situation in which morality is able to 
provide us with guidance, it is impermissible to infringe upon a side-constraint. Of course, once 
it’s made clear that the side-constraint approach implies that there are certain types of acts that 
are impermissible in every non-catastrophic situation, some readers jump to the conclusion that 
it’s a non-starter. But this is a mistake. Whether it’s a non-starter depends on how specific the 
restricted act-types are. Clearly, a view that holds that killing is absolutely prohibited is a non-
starter. But a view that holds that only very specific act-types (such as intentionally killing an 
innocent person against their will without thereby producing at least 1,000 units of impersonal 
goodness) are absolutely prohibited isn’t. And, as we’ll soon see, some side-constraint theorists 
hold precisely this sort of view.   
It’s important to note, then, that there are just two ways for a theory to accommodate a 
non-absolute prohibition against φ-ing (e.g., killing). First, the theory could hold that only 
certain specific types of φ-ings are absolutely prohibited. Or, second, the theory could hold that 
not φ-ing is an end that agents are obligated both to have and to weigh against the other ends 
(e.g., the end of maximizing the impersonal good) that they could achieve only by φ-ing. To 
take the first option is to adopt the side-constraint approach, and to take the second option is to 
adopt the teleological approach.    
 To better understand the side-constraint approach, it will be helpful to have a particular 
constraint in mind. So, let’s consider the Kantian constraint against treating people as mere 
means, where, following Kant (G 4:428), I’ll use the word ‘person’ as a technical term meaning 
‘a being with a rational nature’—that is, someone who has what Kant calls ‘humanity’ and who 
                                                      
4 Thus, ‘impermissible’ does not mean ‘not permissible’. A table is not permissible, but nor is it impermissible. For 
it’s not the sort of thing that can be either permissible or impermissible.  
5 Unfortunately, Nozick simply skirts the issue (1974, 30). 
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is, therefore, autonomous in the sense of being capable of employing reason to set and pursue 
their own ends.6 Now, an agent treats a person as a means if and only if they behave toward 
them in a certain way for the sake of realizing some end, intending the presence or participation 
of some aspect of them to contribute to that end’s realization.7 And an agent treats a person as a 
mere means if and only if all the following hold: (a) they treat that person as a means, (b) that 
person has not given their autonomous consent—consent that’s been freely given in light the 
relevant information—to being treated in this way, and (c) that person can reasonably refuse to 
give their autonomous consent to being treated in this way.8 What’s more, a person can 
reasonably refuse to give their autonomous consent to being treated in a certain way if the 
strongest personal reasons that they can offer against their being treated in this way are at least 
as strong as the strongest personal reasons that anyone else can offer for their being treated in 
this way.9 Thus, if, other things being equal, I inflict a severe headache on Juan against his will 
to prevent several others from each being inflicted with a mild headache, I treat Juan as a mere 
means. For he hasn’t given his consent to being treated in this way and can reasonably refuse to 
do so given that the strongest personal reasons that he can offer against his being treated in this 
way (viz., that this would result in his suffering a severe headache) are at least as strong as the 
strongest personal reasons that each of the others can offer for treating him in this way (viz., 
that this would prevent each of them from suffering a mild headache).10 But if, other things 
                                                      
6 As Korsgaard explains, “the distinctive feature of humanity, as such, is simply the capacity to take a rational 
interest in something: to decide, under the influence of reason, that something is desirable, that it is worthy of pursuit 
or realization, that it is to be deemed important or valuable, not because it contributes to survival or instinctual 
satisfaction, but as an end—for its own sake” (1996, 114). 
7 This is borrowed with modifications from Kerstein 2013, 58.  
8 Here and elsewhere in the paper, I’ve settled on a particular interpretation of Kantian doctrine, but the particular 
interpretation is not important for my overall argument. So, where the reader’s interpretation differs from mine, they 
should feel free to substitute theirs. 
9 Note that I offer only one sufficient condition for reasonable refusal and so remain neutral on what other sufficient 
conditions there are as well as on whether any are necessary.  
10 The personal reasons that a person can offer for (or against) someone’s (either themself or some other) being 
treated in a certain way are just the reasons they have for preferring (or dis-preferring) what their own situation 
would be if this someone were treated this way to what their own situation would be if this someone weren’t treated 
this way. See de Marneffe 2o13, 51.  
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being equal, I inflict a severe headache on Juan against his will to prevent several others from 
each being killed, then, although I treat Juan as a means, I don’t treat him as a mere means. For he 
cannot, it seems, reasonably refuse to consent to his being treated in this way given how much 
more each of the others has at stake.        
By including a constraint against treating people as mere means, a moral theory 
accounts for the separateness of persons. As Nozick points out, “there are only individual 
people, different individual people, with their own individual lives. Using one of these people 
for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the others. Nothing more. …[Thus,] to use a 
person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate 
person, that his is the only life he has” (Nozick 1974, 32–33). Consider, then, that when I inflict a 
severe ten-minute headache on Juan to prevent each of five others from being inflicted with a 
mild ten-minute headache, there is no conscious entity who suffers anything as bad for it as this 
severe ten-minute headache is for Juan. For even if a mild fifty-minute headache is just as bad as 
a severe ten-minute headache, there is no composite mind who suffers anything like a mild 
fifty-minute headache. There are only these other individual minds/persons, who each suffer 
one mild ten-minute headache. And, so, if we want to adequately acknowledge the separateness 
of persons, we must include a constraint against treating people as mere means and recognize 
that it is reasonable for them to refuse to consent to being used if what they would suffer in 
being so used is at least as bad as what anyone else would suffer if they weren’t so used.    
Although including a constraint against treating people as mere means is sufficient to 
account for the separateness of persons, it’s insufficient to account for the Kantian idea that 
people have dignity in the Kantian sense. For that, we must include not merely a constraint, but 
a side-constraint, against treating people as mere means. For we need the absoluteness that 
side-constraints bring. We need this absoluteness because whereas that which has a price can be 
morally and rationally sacrificed, exchanged, or traded away for something of equivalent price, 
that which has dignity has no such equivalence and is, thus, both irreplaceable and non-
substitutable. To have Kantian dignity, then, is to have what Kant calls “incomparable worth” 
(G 4:435–436), which is something that cannot be morally (or rationally) sacrificed, exchanged, 
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or traded away for anything else. Thus, only a moral theory that recognizes that persons are 
inviolable in that there are absolute limits on what agents may morally and rationally do to 
them in the pursuit of their own ends (at least, in non-catastrophic situations) can account for 
the Kantian dignity of persons.      
So, side-constraints account for the idea that persons have Kantian dignity and are, thus, 
inviolable. But there are different degrees of inviolability, and, so, we must ask: “To what 
degree are people inviolable?” The more different ways in which agents are absolutely 
prohibited from treating people without their consent the greater their degree of inviolability. 
Thus, a being who may not be killed in self-defense has, other things being equal, a greater 
degree of inviolability than a being who may be killed in self-defense (Kamm 1996, 274). And a 
being who may be murdered only for the sake of saving no fewer than 1,000 lives has, other 
things being equal, a greater degree of inviolability than a being who may be murdered merely 
for the sake of saving 999 lives. (And note that I’ll be using the word ‘murder’ as a technical 
term meaning ‘deliberately doing something that non-consensually causes lethal harm to an 
innocent person when causing such harm is unnecessary to protect others from that person’.) 
Thus, there may not be a side-constraint against risking murder, but only a side-constraint 
against certain specific types of risking murder: one that, say, absolutely prohibits agents from 
taking more than an n chance (0 ≤ n ≤ 1) of murdering someone for the sake of saving no fewer 
than n × 1,000 lives. Thus, side-constraints should specify the precise extent to which persons 
are protected from various sorts of non-consensual treatment by specifying which specific act-
types are prohibited. And this is what Kamm (1996, 264–75) calls a specified side-constraint. To 
violate a specified side-constraint against, say, risking murder, you must do more than just risk 
committing murder; you must do so in a way that falls outside of the specified allowances—e.g., 
you must take more than an n chance (0 ≤ n ≤ 1) of murdering someone for the sake of saving no 
fewer than n × 1,000 lives.11   
                                                      
11 Imagine that Paola had the opportunity to spin the Wheel of Life and Death but declined to do so (see Hare 2011 
for a similar case). Her spinning the wheel was guaranteed to save 499 lives but had a 0.5 objective chance of non-
consensually killing Aditya, an innocent bystander who posed no threat to anyone. According to this specified side-
constraint, Paola was prohibited from spinning the wheel. For given that there was a 0.5 chance that spinning it 
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Of course, this appeal to people’s limited degree of inviolability isn’t the only way to 
account for the fact that the permissibility of risking murdering someone depends on such 
things as how great that risk is, how bad it would be for that someone to be murdered, and how 
much good would come from taking that risk. For instead of holding that there is some 
precisely specified side-constraint that tells us exactly what kinds of risk-takings are absolutely 
prohibited, we might instead think that agents should adopt the end of minimizing their own 
murders but allow that this end must sometimes be traded off against other legitimate ends. 
Thus, it may be permissible to risk murdering someone for the sake of achieving other 
legitimate ends. But, of course, this is not the side-constraint approach, but rather the 
teleological approach. So, I’ll turn now to explicating it.  
 2.2 The Teleological Approach: The teleological approach originates with 
consequentializers such as Sen (1982), Smith (2009), and Portmore (2011).12 As they and many 
others see it, act-consequentialism (hereafter, simply ‘consequentialism’) tells us, first, what our 
ends should be and, second, how we should act to suitably achieve them. Thus, on 
consequentialism, what our ends should be is explanatorily prior to how we should act, which 
is what makes it teleological. And, so, we can’t easily figure out what we should do without first 
                                                      
would have killed Aditya, doing so needed to ensure that at least 500 (that is, 0.5 × 1,000) lives would have been 
saved. And note that throughout this paper I’ll be primarily concerned with what’s permissible in the fact-relative 
sense—the sense in which it would be impermissible to do what it would in fact be bad to do even if one’s evidence 
suggests that this is what it would be good to do. Also, throughout, I’ll be primarily concerned with objective (i.e., 
ontic) probabilities—probabilities that are out there in the world and that would, therefore, remain even if we were 
omniscient. The objective probability that some event will (or would) occur is the percentage of the time that it will 
(or would) occur under identical causal circumstances—circumstances where the causal laws and histories are the 
same.          
12 ‘Consequentialism’ is a family-resemblance term that refers to all and only those theories that are, in certain 
important structural respects, like its archetype: classical utilitarianism (CU)—see Sinnott-Armstrong (2019) and 
Portmore (Forthcoming). Now, different philosophers have developed different consequentialist theories depending 
on what they see as CU’s most attractive structural features. And they have been led to develop such theories out of a 
concern to avoid the counterintuitive moral verdicts that result from combining such structural features with CU’s 
simplistic value theory: quantitative hedonism. And this is what’s now known as the consequentializing project: the 
project of developing a moral theory that combines a consequentialist structure with a more sophisticated value 
theory, thereby preserving CU’s attractive structural features while avoiding at least some of its counterintuitive 
implications.          
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figuring out what our ends should be. This contrasts with theories that include side-constraints. 
Given that side-constraints prohibit agents from performing certain act-types for the sake of any 
end, we can know that we must refrain from performing such act-types without ever knowing 
what our ends should be. What’s more, these theories hold that what we should do is, contrary 
to consequentialism, explanatorily prior to what our ends should be. Thus, if there’s a side-
constraint against breaking a promise, we should adopt the end of never breaking a promise 
simply because we should never break a promise.  
So, unlike theories containing side-constraints, consequentialism holds that the 
normative statuses of our ends are explanatorily prior to the normative statuses of our actions. 
But, as consequentializers have been keen to point out, consequentialists needn’t hold that 
agents must all adopt the same set of ends. Perhaps, I should have as my end that I minimize the 
promises that I break, but you should have as your end that you minimize the promises that you 
break. So, in addition to having certain agent-neutral ends (such as minimizing promise-
breakings overall), it may be that we should each also have certain agent-relative ends (such as 
minimizing the promises that we ourselves break).  
Besides telling us what our ends should be, a consequentialist theory must tell us how 
we must act to suitably achieve them. And, of course, different consequentialists will hold 
different views. My own view, though, is that an act suitably achieves the ends that the agent 
ought to have if and only if there is no available alternative act whose prospect they ought to 
prefer to that of its own.13 For it seems that which of a set prospects an agent ought to prefer 
                                                      
13 An act’s outcome is the way that the world would turn out if it were performed. However, if the laws of nature are 
indeterministic or the act itself is sufficiently vague, there needn’t be a way that the world would turn out if it were 
performed; there may instead be only several different ways that it could turn out if it were performed. Thus, it’s better 
to talk of an act’s prospect. An act’s prospect is the probability distribution consisting in the mutually exclusive and 
jointly exhaustive set of possible worlds that could be actualized by the given act, with each possibility assigned an 
objective probability such that their sum equals 1. And, of course, if there is only one possible world that could be 
actualized by an act, then its prospect will just be its outcome. Thus, strictly speaking, there’s no need to talk about 
outcomes at all. We can just talk about the prospect of acts, which in certain instances (where the objective probability 
that some possible world will result is 1) will be the outcome of that act.     
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above the rest is just a function of what ends they ought to have and how much relative weight 
they ought to give to each of them. And, so, I endorse the following form of consequentialism.  
 
Agent-Relative Consequentialism (ARC): For any subject S and any act available to 
them φ, their φ-ing is morally permissible if and only if there is no available alternative 
act whose prospect they ought to prefer to that of their φ-ing. And the most 
fundamental permissibility-making feature of a permissible action is its lacking an 
available alternative whose prospect they ought to prefer to that of its own.14 
 
ARC allows us to accommodate constraints within a teleological framework. To 
illustrate, take the constraint against breaking a promise. To accommodate this constraint, ARC 
need only hold that, for any subject S, S ought to prefer the prospect of their refraining from 
breaking a promise to the prospect of their breaking that promise to prevent two others from 
each breaking a morally comparable promise. The idea would be that subjects ought, other 
things being equal, to give greater weight to the end of minimizing their own promise-
breakings than to the end of minimizing promise-breakings overall. Thus, the resulting version 
of ARC would imply, for instance, that Abbey is prohibited from breaking her promise to Abe 
even to prevent both Bertha from breaking her morally comparable promise to Bert and Carla 
from breaking her morally comparable promise to Carl. The resulting view would also imply 
that Carla is prohibited from breaking her promise to Carl even to prevent both Abbey from 
breaking her morally comparable promise to Abe and Bertha from breaking her morally 
comparable promise to Bert. Indeed, it yields the same constraint against breaking a promise 
regardless of who’s in the position of breaking a promise to minimize morally comparable 
promise-breakings. 
What makes this approach to incorporating constraints teleological is that it treats not 
performing acts of a certain types as an end and, so, it allows—at least, in principle—that the 
                                                      
14 Strictly speaking, what I endorse is a maximalist, dual-ranking revision of ARC. See Portmore 2011 and 2019. But 
these qualifications won’t matter here.     
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agent’s other legitimate ends can affect the permissibility of her performing this act-type.15 
Thus, although this view prohibits breaking a promise to prevent two others from each 
breaking a morally comparable promise, it can permit doing so for the sake of achieving various 
other ends. And, so, it can accommodate the following intuitive moral verdicts: (V1) it’s 
permissible to break a promise to help a friend move to prevent someone from losing a limb; 
(V2) it’s permissible to break a promise to help a friend move to prevent a thousand others from 
each breaking a morally comparable promise;16 (V3) it’s permissible to break a promise to help 
a friend move on the present occasion to prevent oneself from breaking a morally comparable 
promise on each of five future occasions; (V4) it’s permissible to break a promise to help a friend 
move to reduce by half the risk of someone’s being murdered; and (V5) it’s permissible to break 
a promise to help a friend move to reduce by a tenth the risk that one will commit murder. After 
all, it seems that agents should have several other ends besides that of ensuring that they 
themselves do not at present break a promise, including all the following: (E1) minimizing 
promise-breakings overall; (E2) minimizing their own promise-breakings over time; (E3) 
minimizing the risk to each person that they will lose a limb; (E4) minimizing the risk to each 
person that they will be murdered; and (E5) minimizing the risk that they themselves will 
commit murder. What’s more, it seems that an agent should prefer the prospect of their doing 
what’s necessary to achieve these ends to that of their keeping their present promise to help a 
friend move, for it seems that ends such as E1–E5 should be given more weight than that of 
keeping their present promise. Thus, ARC can accommodate a wide of range of intuitive moral 
verdicts concerning when it is and isn’t permissible to break a present promise.      
                                                      
15 Of course, the teleological approach could yield the same moral verdicts that the side-constraint approach does by 
holding that the end of not performing an act of a certain type (say, murder) is to be given lexical priority over all 
other ends. In that case, the teleologist would claim that it is never permissible to commit murder just as those who 
claim that there is a side-constraint against murder do. But the two views would still differ in their accounts of why 
it’s never permissible to commit murder. For the teleologist would hold that it’s because this end has lexical priority 
over all other ends, whereas the side-constraint theorist would hold that it’s because there are certain types of acts 
that we’re absolutely prohibited from performing in the pursuit of any end.      
16 A constraint against breaking a promise needn’t prohibit breaking a promise to prevent more than two others from 
each breaking a morally comparable promise.  
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3. Three Advantages to Taking the Teleological Approach  
3.1 Its Theoretical Simplicity. Besides being able to accommodate a wide range of intuitive moral 
verdicts, the teleological approach has the advantage of being able to do so with less theoretical 
apparatus. For even those who reject the teleological approach should accept two of its claims: 
(C1) that agents should have ends such as E1–E5 and (C2) that they should, other things being 
equal, do what would best achieve them. Thus, what sets plausible versions of the side-
constraint approach apart from the teleological approach is not that it denies these two claims, 
but only that it makes the additional claim that there are side-constraints that limit what agents 
may permissibly do in pursuit of these ends. The problem, though, is that once we accept these 
two claims, there’s no need to incur this additional commitment. For, as I’ll show below, these 
two plausible claims are themselves sufficient to account for all the relevant intuitive moral 
verdicts.17   
The side-constraint theorist should accept C1—that agents should have ends such as E1–
E5—to account for why agents should feel some lingering regret whenever they’re forced to 
sacrifice one of these ends. To illustrate, consider that agents are morally required to break a 
relatively trivial promise to save a life. Yet, someone who did so should still regret having to 
break their promise. For they should want not only to save lives but also to keep their promises. 
And this end is what explains why they should feel some residual dissatisfaction in having to 
break their promise to save the life even though they are permitted to do so.18   
Also, the side-constraint theorist should accept C2—that agents should, other things 
being equal, do what would best achieve the ends that they ought to have—to explain why 
agents should further such ends even when doing so is unnecessary to avoid infringing upon 
any constraints. To illustrate, suppose that an agent must choose between doing nothing and 
                                                      
17 But, perhaps, the thought is that, although this additional commitment isn’t needed to yield such intuitive verdicts, 
it is needed to provide the correct explanation for them. I’ll debunk this thought in section 4 below.  
18 It seems to me that one should always regret breaking a promise and, thus, should regret doing so even when this 
isn’t regrettable simply because it causes those who were counting on one to be disappointed.  
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saving a life, and assume that everything else is equal. Thus, assume that neither option would 
involve infringing upon a constraint. Now, to explain why they ought to save the life, the side-
constraint theorist should appeal both to the fact that agents should have saving lives as an end 
and to the fact that they should, other things being equal, do what would best achieve the ends 
that they ought to have.  
Thus, it seems that the side-constraint theorist should accept both C1 and C2. Only then 
can they plausibly account both for the regret that agents should feel whenever they are 
required to sacrifice certain ends and for the pro tanto moral obligation that they have to further 
these ends. But, in that case, the side-constraint theorist gains nothing in terms of the verdicts 
that they’re able to accommodate by making the additional claim that there are side-constraints. 
For, as the consequentializers have shown, we can accommodate all the relevant intuitive moral 
verdicts simply by postulating that agents should both adopt certain ends and do what would 
best achieve them. To illustrate, suppose that the relevant intuitive moral verdicts include V1–
V5 from above. To accommodate such verdicts, the side-constraint theorist must postulate some 
elaborately specified side-constraint against breaking a promise, one that incorporates all the 
necessary allowances for accommodating such an array of verdicts. By contrast, the teleologist 
need only postulate what the side-constraint theorist should already accept: various obligatory 
ends (such as E1–E5) and a pro tanto moral obligation to do what would best achieve them.      
3.2 Its Conception of Choice-Worthy Action. Another advantage of the teleological approach 
is that it, unlike the side-constraint approach, embodies a certain attractive conception of choice-
worthy action. This conception stems from the realization that it is through our actions that we 
attempt to affect the way the world goes. Whenever we face a choice of what to do, we also face 
a choice of which of various possible worlds to attempt to actualize. Moreover, whenever we act 
intentionally, we act with the aim of making the world go a certain way. The aim needn’t be 
anything having to do with the causal consequences of the act. The aim could be nothing more 
than to perform the act in question. For instance, one can run merely with the aim of running. 
The fact remains, though, that for every intentional action there is some end (or ends) at which 
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the agent aims.19 It’s natural, then, to think that the most choice-worthy act—the act that the 
agent ought to perform—is just the one that will make the world go as she ought to aim for it to 
go.20  
This natural thought is somewhat similar to what Samuel Scheffler calls the maximizing 
conception of rationality. According to this conception, “if one accepts the desirability of a certain 
goal being achieved, and if one has a choice between two options, one of which is certain to 
accomplish the goal better than the other, then it is, ceteris paribus, rational to choose the former 
over the latter” (1985, 414). However, the thought that I have in mind is a bit different and, I 
believe, more plausible. For one, Scheffler’s conception is beholden to what the agent takes to be 
the case rather than what is in fact the case, for it concerns subjective rationality rather than 
objective choice-worthiness. For another, Scheffler’s conception appeals to the goodness (or, as 
he puts it, the ‘desirability’) of a goal’s being achieved rather than the degree to which the agent 
should want it to be achieved. This is important, because, as Philippa Foot notes, it can “be right 
to prefer a worse state of affairs to a better” (1985, 198). For although we should certainly want 
the world to change for the better, this isn’t all that we should want. We should, it seems, also 
want those to whom we have close ties to fare well and not solely to the extent that their faring 
well would promote the impersonal good. Thus, I should prefer that my daughter rather than 
some stranger is saved even if it would be slightly better, impersonally speaking, were the 
stranger saved instead. It seems, then, that agents should sometimes prefer a worse state of 
affairs to a better. And, given this, we should think that what agents should do tracks what they 
should desire rather than what’s most valuable/desirable.  
For these reasons, I believe that we should accept, not what Scheffler calls the maximizing 
                                                      
19 This is widely endorsed by consequentialists and non-consequentialists alike. For instance, John Stuart Mill says, 
“all action is for the sake of some end” (Utilitarianism, chap. 1). And Immanuel Kant says, “an end is an object of the 
free faculty of choice [i.e., the free Willkür], the representation of which determines it to action, whereby [the end] is 
brought about. Every action, thus, has its end” (Metaphysics of Morals, 6:384–385).  
20 Even some non-consequentialists come close to endorsing this. For instance, Judith Jarvis Thomson says: “given 
that for a person to act just is for the world to go in a way that it otherwise would not go, surely the question whether 
he ought to act had better turn on a comparison between how it will go if he acts and how it will go if he does 
something else—to repeat, there seems to be nothing else for it to turn on” (2003, 8).   
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conception of rationality, but what I’ll call the maximizing conception of choice-worthy action: if one 
ought to have a certain set of ends, and if one has a choice between two options, one of which 
will better achieve these ends than the other, then one ought to choose this one over the other.21 
This, I believe, is quite difficult to deny.22 Consequently, it’s hard to see how Abbey ought to 
refrain from breaking her promise to Abe to prevent both Bertha from breaking her morally 
comparable promise to Bert and Carla from breaking her morally comparable promise to Carl if 
the only end that Abbey should have is to minimize promise-breakings overall. And, thus, such 
a constraint can seem paradoxical unless we admit that Abbey should additionally have some 
end that would be achieved by her refraining from breaking her promise to Abe, such as either 
the end of refraining from breaking any promises at present or the end of minimizing her 
promise-breakings over time. For if actions aim at achieving ends, then although it would make 
sense to prohibit performing certain types of actions when performing such actions would 
thwart these ends, it wouldn’t make sense to prohibit such actions even when performing them 
would best achieve the ends that one ought to have. But we can avoid such paradoxical views 
by embracing the maximizing conception of choice-worthy action and using the teleological 
approach to accommodate constraints on ARC.    
3.3 Its Ability to Plausibly Deal with Morally Relevant Indeterminacy. Lastly, ARC is better 
suited to deal with the fact that there can be indeterminacy with respect to whether an agent has 
infringed (or would infringe) upon a given constraint. But, before explaining what makes ARC 
better suited to deal with this, let me explain how such indeterminacy can arise. There are at 
least three ways.  
First, whether an act counts as infringing upon a constraint can depend on what some 
                                                      
21 This is because the reason to perform an action is just that it would further the ends that one has reason to pursue. 
As Allen Wood, interpreting Kant, puts it: “an action is something that is in the agent’s power, and is chosen as a 
means to the agent’s end (G 4:427). Looked at from this standpoint, it is the end that supplies the reason for every 
action. But…there must be a reason for setting the end. The end [must be] good or valuable in some way; …or it 
[must be] an end that morality requires you to have…. So instead of saying only that the end is the reason for the 
action, it is more appropriate to say that the reason for setting the end is the reason for the action” (2017, 266).     
22 Admittedly, however, some do. See Hurley (2018) and Muñoz (2021).     
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free agent would have done had that act not been performed. To illustrate, assume that there’s a 
constraint against murder. (And recall that I’m using the word ‘murder’ to mean ‘deliberately 
doing something that non-consensually causes lethal harm to an innocent person—that is, a 
person who has not yet committed any offense—when causing such harm is unnecessary to 
protect others from that person’.) And now consider The Sniper. Imagine that Gunnar (an 
inn0cent person) was shot and killed by a sniper as he was attempting to enter a school building 
with a gun. Did the sniper infringe upon the constraint against murder in killing Gunnar? Well, 
it depends on whether this was necessary to protect others, which in turn depends on whether 
Gunnar would have hurt anyone had he not been shot. But it’s entirely possible that he had the 
kind of libertarian freedom that implies that there was a non-zero ontic probability that he 
would have hurt someone had he not been shot. And, in that case, there will just be no fact of 
the matter as to what he would have done had he not been shot. And, so, it will be 
indeterminate whether the sniper infringed upon the constraint against murder.  
Second, it could be indeterminate whether some necessary condition for infringing upon 
a constraint has been satisfied. To illustrate, assume that there’s a constraint against breaking a 
promise. And now consider The Promise, which is a revised version of a case given by Jackson 
and Smith (2006). Imagine that there is just no fact of the matter as to whether a woman named 
Lupe promised to vote for Candidate X at last night’s party. Perhaps, she said “I promise to vote 
for Candidate X” but it’s ontically indeterminate whether she was too drunk at the time to be 
capable of making a genuine promise—for there will certainly be a sorites series from a BAC 
(blood alcohol content) of 0.0 to a BAC of 0.37, where the latter can be lethal. Or, perhaps, she 
said something like “I will vote for Candidate X” but the context left it ontically indeterminate 
whether she was thereby promising to vote for Candidate X or just predicting that she would 
vote for Candidate X. Nevertheless, suppose that she ends up refraining from voting for 
Candidate X. In so refraining, did she break a promise? It seems indeterminate. For it’s ontically 
indeterminate whether she even promised to vote for Candidate X. And, thus, it’s ontically 
indeterminate whether she has infringed upon the constraint against breaking a promise.   
Third, indeterminacy with respect to whether an agent would have infringed upon a 
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constraint had they performed a given act can arise given that the act counts as infringing upon 
the constraint if and only if a certain counterfactual is true and counts as not infringing upon 
that constraint if and only if its contradictory counterfactual is true. For, in some instances, 
neither counterfactual will be true given the semantics of counterfactuals.  
To illustrate, assume that there’s a constraint against murder, as I’ve stipulatively 
defined it above. And, now, consider the following case, which I borrow, with some revisions, 
from Jean-Paul Vessel (2003, 104–5). 
 
The Demon’s Coin: A powerful demon produces a magical but fair coin and offers Parisa 
the chance to flip it. If she flips the coin and it lands heads, that will cause lives to be 
saved. If she flips the coin and it lands tails, that will cause lives to be lost. And, if she 
abstains from flipping it, things will be left unaffected. Parisa decides to abstain. 
 
The relevant counterfactuals are:  
 
CF1  If Parisa had flipped the coin, it would have landed heads.  
CF2  If Parisa had flipped the coin, it would have landed tails.  
 
Now, if CF1 is true, then Parisa would not have violated the constraint had she flipped 
the coin. And, if CF2 is true, then she would have violated the constraint had she flipped the 
coin. But which is true? Clearly, they can’t both be true. Since they have the same antecedent 
and logically incompatible consequents, one will be false if the other is true. Interestingly, 
though, neither is true. They’re either both false or both indeterminate.23 This is because there is 
no fact of the matter as to whether the coin would have landed heads (or tails) had Parisa 
                                                      
23 On David Lewis’s theory (1973), they’re both false. And, on Robert Stalnaker’s theory (1984), they both have 
indeterminate truth values. And these two theories seem to be the two leading contenders. (I’m told, though, by 
Daniel Muñoz in correspondence that Alan Hájek is developing a new theory, one on which most counterfactuals, 
including both CF1 and CF2, are false.)     
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flipped it. To accept this, we don’t need to assume the laws of nature are indeterministic. Nor 
do we need to hold that there is more than just one actual future. We need only to accept both 
that (1) the antecedents in CF1 and CF2 are underspecified given that there are countless 
specific ways that Parisa could have flipped the coin (only some of which would have resulted 
in the coin’s landing heads) and that (2) Parisa lacked the ability to determine whether she 
flipped the coin in any of the specific ways that would have resulted in its landing heads.    
Parisa lacks the ability to determine whether she flips a coin in any of the specific ways 
that would result in its landing heads, because whether a coin lands heads (or tails) depends on 
very minute differences with respect to how she flips it: e.g., the precise locations of both the 
coin and her thumb when the two make impact, the precise force with which her thumb 
impacts the coin, and the precise orientation of both the coin and her thumb on impact. Since 
she lacks the dexterity to determine these details with any precision and since the result of her 
coin toss is extremely sensitive to them, she can’t control whether she flips the coin in a way that 
results in its landing heads (or tails). And, given all this, there is just no fact of the matter 
concerning whether, had she flipped the coin, it would have landed heads (or tails). And, thus, 
there is no fact of the matter concerning whether, had she flipped the coin, she would have 
infringed upon the constraint against doing what would cause someone to be killed.  
These three are cases of morally relevant indeterminacy—that is, indeterminacy with 
respect to whether some morally relevant state of affairs obtains (or would obtain). Given all 
these different ways that moral indeterminacy can arise, I doubt that we can avoid it altogether. 
Of course, some might argue that, in The Promise, the relevant indeterminacy is only semantic 
and not ontic, claiming that although we can’t know whether Parisa was too drunk to be 
capable of making a genuine promise, there was, nevertheless, some fact of the matter (see, e.g., 
Williamson 1994). And others might want to claim that, in The Sniper, the relevant constraint 
can’t be against murder but must instead be against taking an objective risk of committing 
murder. Now, I’m skeptical that such avoidance tactics will succeed in all cases that are like 
either The Sniper or The Promise. But, even if I were to concede this much, there would still be 
cases like The Demon’s Coin, where the morally relevant indeterminacy seems unavoidable. 
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Consequently, I think that our moral theories must be prepared to deal with such morally 
relevant indeterminacy.  
One way of dealing with morally relevant indeterminacy is to just allow that wherever 
there is morally relevant indeterminacy, there must also be deontic indeterminacy—that is, 
indeterminacy regarding an act’s deontic status (such as whether it ought to be performed).24 
But there are at least two reasons to reject any moral theory that countenances deontic 
determinacy (and both are inspired by similar remarks in Dougherty 2016).  
First, prospectively, moral theories are meant to tell us what we ought to do. But if there 
is deontic indeterminacy, then it will be as if you are presented with a tile that is neither red nor 
not red and commanded to put it in a certain box if and only if it is red and to refrain from 
putting it in that box if and only if it is not red (Dougherty 2016, 449). The problem is that 
there’s no way to do as commanded, which makes such commandments pointless. Imagine, 
then, that you have the option of φ-ing and a given moral theory implies that it’s indeterminate 
whether you morally ought to φ. What’s more, assume that this theory—as any moral theory 
must—directs you to φ if and only if φ is what you morally ought to do, and directs you to 
refrain from φ-ing if and only if φ is not what you morally ought to do. The problem is there is 
no way for you to do as directed. And what’s the point of a moral theory that gives us directives 
that are impossible to follow?  
Second, retrospectively, moral theories are meant to tell us whether morally responsible 
agents are blameworthy (or praiseworthy)—and, thus, deserving of sanction (or reward)—for 
                                                      
24 Several philosophers have argued that deontic indeterminacy just follows from morally relevant indeterminacy—
see, for instance, Tom Dougherty (2016, 449), Miriam Schoenfield (2016, 262-3), and Billy Dunaway (2017, 40). They 
all give the following sort of argument based on a sorites series: “I will assume that it is determinately permissible to 
terminate a one-day old zygote [and determinately impermissible to terminate a one-year old child]. However, there 
seems no specific point in an entity’s continuous development from zygote to one-year old at which it acquires moral 
personhood. …Instead, the entity passes through a range of borderline cases of moral personhood. When the entity is 
in this range, it is indeterminate whether it is permissible to terminate it” (Dougherty 2016, 449). But from the fact 
that it’s permissible to terminate a non-person, impermissible to terminate a person, and indeterminate whether a 
certain entity is a person, it doesn’t follow that it’s indeterminate whether it’s permissible to terminate that entity. For 
a moral theory could hold that it’s not only impermissible to terminate a person, but also impermissible to terminate 
any borderline case of moral personhood.     
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their actions. But if a moral theory allows for deontic determinacy, then it will sometimes be 
indeterminate whether a morally responsible agent has done anything blameworthy (or 
praiseworthy). For instance, if, in The Demon’s Die, it’s indeterminate whether Parisa acted 
wrongly in refraining from rolling the die (because it’s indeterminate whether her rolling the 
die would have saved or cost lives), then it will be indeterminate whether she is blameworthy or 
praiseworthy in so refraining. And, thus, it will be indeterminate whether she deserves sanction 
or reward. But we might wonder what’s the point of a moral theory that can’t tell us whether 
morally responsible agents who perform non-neutral acts are blameworthy or praiseworthy for 
their behavior. What’s more, we might wonder whether it even makes sense to suppose that it 
could be indeterminate whether someone deserves sanction or reward for responsibly 
performing a non-neutral act, for this doesn’t seem to be the sort of thing that an adequate 
moral theory can just leave unresolved.      
It’s fortunate, then, that ARC can deal with morally relevant indeterminacy without 
having to countenance deontic indeterminacy. To illustrate, consider again The Promise. 
Although there is no fact of the matter as to whether Lupe broke a promise in refraining from 
voting for Candidate X, ARC can insist that in refraining from voting for Candidate X she acted 
either permissibly or impermissibly, and determinately so. For ARC can insist that Lupe is 
required to have as one of her ends that it be (determinately) true that she has not broken a 
promise. And she achieves this end if and only if she votes for Candidate X. Of course, she 
ought to have other ends as well, such as that of making the world better. And let’s suppose that 
she did make the world better in refraining from voting for Candidate X given that this resulted 
in a better candidate’s being elected. And, so, whether Lupe acted permissibly in refraining 
from voting for Candidate X just depends on the relative importance of these two ends: (1) 
making the world go better by refraining from voting for Candidate X and (2) making it 
(determinately) true that she hasn’t broken a promise by voting for Candidate X. If the former is 
at least as important as the latter, then she acted permissibly in refraining from voting for 
Candidate X and, if not, she acted impermissibly. Thus, ARC will hold that even though it’s 
indeterminate whether Lupe promised to vote for Candidate X, it’s determinate whether she 
acted permissibly in refraining from doing so. So, the teleological approach can handle morally 
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relevant indeterminacy without having to countenance deontic indeterminacy.25   
By contrast, the side-constraint approach must countenance deontic indeterminacy if 
there are side-constraints against such things as murder and promise-breaking. For, as we’ve 
seen above, it can be indeterminate whether an act is of such a type. Of course, the side-
constraint theorist could just deny that there are side-constraints against performing such act-
types and hold instead that there are only constraints against doing what will make it 
determinately true that one has performed an act of this type. That is, they could deny that there 
is, say, a constraint against breaking a promise and hold instead that there is only a constraint 
against doing what would make it (determinately) true that one has broken a promise. This is 
what we might call the truth-centric side-constraint approach (see Williams 2017). This approach 
may seem odd and perhaps even ad hoc, but it would at least allow the side-constraint theorist 
to avoid deontic determinacy. But I find it implausible. To see why, consider again The Promise. 
In this case, the fact that Lupe did and said things last night that make it indeterminate whether 
she promised to vote for Candidate X seems like a good moral reason for her to vote for 
Candidate X. But it’s hard for the truth-centric side-constraint approach to account for this. 
After all, there is, on this approach, only a constraint against doing what will make it 
determinately true that she has broken a promise. Thus, there is on this view no constraint that 
Lupe infringes upon by refraining from voting for Candidate X. Why, then, is there a moral 
reason for her instead to vote for Candidate X? The answer, it seems, is that Lupe ought both to 
have ensuring that it’s determinately true that she has broken no promises as an end and to do 
what will, other things being equal, best achieve the ends that she ought to have. In other 
words, we see again that the side-constraint theorist should accept claims such as C1 and C2. 
                                                      
25 The reader may wonder about higher-order indeterminacy. For instance, the reader may wonder what the 
teleologist would say if it’s indeterminate whether in refraining from voting for Candidate X it is or isn’t 
(determinately) true that she has thereby broken a promise. Perhaps, given higher-order indeterminacy, there’s a 0.4 
objective chance that it’s (determinately) true and a 0.6 objective chance that it isn’t. But, even in such a case, there 
can still be a determinate fact of the matter whether Lupe ought to prefer the prospect of her voting for Candidate X 
to the prospect of her refraining from voting for Candidate X given her obligatory and discretionary ends and the 
objective probabilities that they will be achieved on each of these two alternatives. And, consequently, there will be, 
on the teleological approach, a determinate fact about whether she’s permitted to refrain from voting for Candidate 
X.     
 22 
But, as we saw above, they do so at some cost. For once they do so, there is no longer any reason 
to postulate side-constraints, for these claims are themselves sufficient to account for all the 
intuitive verdicts. Thus, the side-constraint theorist can avoid deontic indeterminacy only at the 
cost of parsimony.  
 
4. Two Putative Disadvantages to Taking the Teleological Approach  
I’ve argued that the teleological approach has several advantages over the side-constraint 
approach. Of course, this doesn’t mean that the teleological approach wins the day. For it may 
be that the teleological approach has its own disadvantages, and these could tip the balance 
back in favor of the side-constraint approach. Indeed, many have thought so (see, e.g., Brook 
1991, Emet 2010, Howard 2021, Kamm 1996, Löschke 2020, and Otsuka 2011). But, as I’ll argue 
below, their thinking is the result of misunderstanding what the teleologist is committed to.26    
 4.1 Some claim that the teleological approach fails to acknowledge both the true value of persons 
and the fact that some constraints are ultimately grounded in the statuses of patients as opposed to the 
ends of agents: First, several philosophers (e.g., Anderson 1993) have objected to consequentialist 
views such as ARC on the grounds that they fail to acknowledge the true value of persons. As 
they see it, persons are among the fundamental bearers of value. Indeed, they have inherent, 
unconditional, and irreplaceable value in virtue of their distinctive capacity for employing 
reason to set and pursue their own ends. And we respond to this value appropriately by first 
and foremost respecting them and their rational choices. For this respect is owed to them. But, 
as these philosophers see things, consequentialists must deny this. As they see it, 
consequentialists are committed to there being only one kind of value: the kind that’s to be 
desired and, consequently, promoted. And since only states of affairs can be promoted, they see 
                                                      
26 One putative disadvantage of the teleological approach is that it is “gimmicky” (Nozick 1974, 29). I won’t address 
this worry here, for it has been adequately dealt with elsewhere—see, e.g., Broome 1991, Dreier 1993, Sen 1983, Smith 
2009, Otsuka 2011, and Vallentyne 1988. What’s more, I believe that the version of consequentialism that I develop 
below will seem anything but gimmicky, as it is, I’ll argue, the most intuitive and parsimonious way to accommodate 
Kant’s insights.      
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consequentialists as being committed to states of affairs being the only fundamental bearers of 
value. Thus, they see consequentialists as committed to people having only conditional value: 
value solely on the condition that they make the realization of good states of affairs possible. 
They assume, then, that consequentialists must regard people as mere receptacles for the 
realization of value (such as pleasure), which makes them replaceable in that we may 
permissibly destroy some of them for the sake of bringing others into existence so long as there 
will, in the end, be at least as much good held in these new receptacles as were held in the old 
ones.  
Second, several philosophers (e.g., Emet 2010, Howard 2021, and Löschke 2020) have 
objected to such consequentialist views on the grounds that they fail to acknowledge the fact 
that some constraints are ultimately grounded in the statuses of patients as autonomous beings 
whose rational choices are owed respect. For, as they see it, consequentialists must instead hold 
that the ultimate grounds for constraints lie with agents and their self-centered desire to keep 
their own hands clean. For instance, Howard claims that the consequentialist’s defense of the 
wrongness of your infringing upon a constraint is “self-indulgent,” for “it appeals ultimately to 
a self-centered preference to keep your own hands clean” (2021, 246). By contrast, Howard and 
others believe that constraints are “only plausibly defended by referencing not some fact about 
you, the agent, but about the patient. [For, as they see it,] it is in virtue of something about the 
patient, …the respect you owe her…, that generates the agent-relative reasons against” your 
infringing upon the constraint (Emet 2010, 6). And, thus, as they see it, constraints are “victim-
focused rather than agent-focused” (Kamm 1996, 279) in that they are grounded only in the 
statuses of the potential victims and not in the ends of the agents.    
But I believe that both objections are simply the result of these philosophers 
misunderstanding what consequentialists are committed to. Consequentialists are committed to 
the evaluative ranking of prospects being explanatory prior to the deontic statuses of the actions 
associated with them, but this doesn’t commit them to valuing persons in any particular way.27 
                                                      
27 Thus, if you wish to eschew consequentialism altogether while justifying constraints against treating people in 
certain ways by appeal to their humanity, then you should not understand the normative significance of their 
humanity in axiological terms—see Bader Forthcoming. (And note that an evaluative ranking of some set is one that 
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Nor does it commit them to holding that it is the ends of agents as opposed to the statuses of 
patients that ultimately ground constraints. For although the consequentialist is certainly 
committed to the deontic statuses of actions being grounded in the evaluative ranking of their 
prospects, they needn’t deny that this evaluative ranking is ultimately grounded in the statuses 
of patients.28 To demonstrate this, I will now develop a Kantian version of ARC, one that 
accepts as much as possible a Kantian theory of the value of persons. And I’ll call it 
Kantsequentialism.29  
Kantsequentialism endorses the following Kantian theory of value. The fundamental 
bearers of value include persons. And persons are ends-in-themselves—that is, beings who have 
objective worth in virtue of their inherent nature. Importantly, the value of an end-in-itself is 
most immediately normative for non-propositional attitudes such as love and respect rather 
than for propositional attitudes such as ‘desiring that’ and ‘intending to bring it about that’ 
(Anderson 1993, 17). Indeed, we should desire and pursue certain states of affairs mainly as a 
way of properly expressing our respect for people and their rational choices (Anderson 1993, 
20). What’s more, people are, in Kant’s terminology, self-standing ends. “A self-[standing] end 
                                                      
ranks its members in terms of the weight of the subject’s reasons for desiring each of them—see Portmore 2011, 34–
38.)          
28 Of course, you may define ‘consequentialism’ differently than I do. As you define it, consequentialism may 
necessarily be an agent-neutral theory (Howard-Snyder 1993). Or it may, on your definition, be committed to holding 
that states of affairs are the only fundamental bearers of intrinsic value (Anderson 1993, 30). Or it may even be that, 
on your definition, consequentialism cannot give a foundational role to anything other than the evaluative ranking of 
outcomes—and, thus, cannot, as Kantsequentialism does, give a foundational role to our duty to respect persons. Fair 
enough. ‘Consequentialism’ is after all a family-resemblance term (see Sinnott-Armstrong 2019 and Portmore 
Forthcoming), and people will, therefore, define it differently depending on what they take the most important 
feature of its archetype (viz., classical utilitarianism) to be. Now, as I see it, the most important feature of classical 
utilitarianism is that it takes the deontic statuses of actions to be grounded in an evaluative ranking of their 
prospects. But, in any case, how we label theories such as ARC is not that important. For what’s important for my 
arguments is only that ARC can adopt the teleological approach to accommodating constraints and thereby gain its 
advantages.        
29 I borrow this clever term from Richard Arneson’s 1997 PHIL 224 class handout entitled “Consequentialism and 
Justice.” Note that Kantsequentialism isn’t at all like David Cummiskey’s Kantian consequentialism. For whereas 
Cummiskey (1996) attempts to derive agent-neutral consequentialism as a first-order moral theory from Kant’s 
second-order metaethical assumptions, I will attempt to incorporate Kantian first-order moral verdicts within a 
consequentialist framework.          
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(selbständiger Zweck) (G 4:437)…is something that already exists and whose ‘existence is in 
itself an end’, having worth as something to be esteemed, preserved, and furthered.” And a self-
standing end contrasts with what Kant calls “an end to be effected (zu bewirkender Zweck), that 
is, some thing or state of affairs that does not yet exist but is to be brought about through an 
agent's causality (G 4:437) [italics added]” (Wood 1999, 115). Thus, people have the sort of value 
that’s to be respected when present rather than brought about when absent. And, so, this value 
doesn’t call for us to bring as many people into existence as possible, but rather calls for us to 
respect those who already exist. Indeed, we owe them our respect. Also, the value of persons is 
unconditional. And, thus, a person cannot lose their worth as an end-in-themself except by 
ceasing to be a person (that is, by ceasing to have the rational capacity for setting and pursuing 
their own ends). So, even if a person commits horrible deeds or loses their capacity for 
happiness, their worth as an end-in-themself is not at all diminished.  
Again, the proper evaluative response to such value is first and foremost to respect that 
which has it. And this is an attitude, not an action. But, like all attitudes, this attitude is 
associated with certain motivational tendencies and the actions that they commonly engender. 
Thus, respect for persons will involve not only having the affect of feeling awe and esteem for 
their humanity, but also having the following dispositions: (1) not to interfere with their 
autonomous choices, (2) to inquire with an open mind as to the reasons for their choices, (3) to 
try to reason with them rather than manipulate them when we fear that they will otherwise 
make bad choices, and (4) to hold them accountable when they do make bad choices. Most 
importantly, though, respect for persons will involve having a disposition to refrain from 
treating them as mere means.  
So, on Kantsequentialism, people are ends-in-themselves who are inherently and 
unconditionally valuable and are, thus, owed our respect. Also, given that they are self-standing 
ends, they are irreplaceable. Consequently, it would be impermissible to kill one person even 
for the sake of bringing several other happier people into existence. Also, on Kantsequentialism, 
our most fundamental duty is to respect people and their statuses as ends-in-themselves. And, 
from this duty, we derive a duty to adopt as an end treating them always as ends-in-themselves 
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and never as mere means. And, on Kantsequentialism, this end will have some sort of general 
but non-lexical priority over both our discretionary ends and our other obligatory ends, 
including those of both minimizing murders overall and minimizing the murders that we 
ourselves commit.30 Thus, agents ought generally to prefer the prospect of their refraining from 
murdering someone at present to the prospect of their doing so as a means to minimizing 
murders overall, or even as a means to minimizing the murders that they themself commit. But, 
because this priority is only some sort of general priority, Kantsequentialism needn’t prohibit 
treating someone harmlessly as a mere means when necessary to prevent yourself from very 
likely accidentally killing someone in the future. And, because this priority is non-lexical, the 
quantities matter. So, if murdering someone at present is the only way to prevent, say, hundreds 
of murders by others or, say, dozens of future murders by yourself, then you ought to prefer the 
prospect of your committing that present murder to that of your refraining from doing so. 
Consequently, there will, on Kantsequentialism, be a non-absolute prohibition against murder 
such that you are permitted to murder one person as a means to preventing either more than m 
murders by others or more than n murders by yourself (m > n), but are prohibited from doing so 
as a means to preventing either m or fewer murders by others or n or fewer murders by 
yourself. 
All this is compatible with acknowledging that people are ends-in-themselves who are 
inherently and unconditionally valuable and, so, owed our respect. Indeed, it seems that the 
only part of Kant’s theory of value that the Kantsequentialist must reject is his claim that people 
have “dignity” in the sense of having incomparable worth. Of course, the Kantsequentialist will 
accept that people have dignity in the ordinary sense of being worthy of respect, but the 
Kantsequentialist must deny that people have incomparable worth such that they cannot be 
morally (or rationally) sacrificed, exchanged, or traded away for anything else. Instead, the 
Kantsequentialist will endorse the teleological approach, where refraining at present from 
                                                      
30 As noted above, we could on the teleological approach—and, thus, on the Kantsequentialist approach—give some 
ends lexical priority over all others and thereby mimic the moral verdicts that the side-constraint approach yields. 
But I just don’t find this plausible. Thus, as I conceive of the view, Kantsequentialism holds that various ends have 
only non-lexical priority over others.          
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treating someone as a mere means is an end that can be sacrificed, exchanged, or traded away 
for the sake of sufficiently weighty other ends. But this is not a problem for Kantsequentialism, 
for Kant’s claim that persons have incomparable worth is quite implausible. After all, if people 
had incomparable worth, then killing in self-defense would be impermissible.31 For, in doing 
so, you would be killing them as a means to preserving your own life, thus sacrificing their 
humanity for the sake of your own. But it’s absurd to think that killing in self-defense is 
impermissible. So, we should reject the idea that people have incomparable worth such that it is 
never permissible to treat them as mere means. And, therefore, I believe that Kantsequentialism 
can acknowledge the true value of persons, for their true value is inherent and unconditional, 
but not incomparable.         
The Kantsequentialist can also acknowledge that some constraints are ultimately 
grounded in the statuses of patients rather than the ends of agents. Howard denies this. For 
when speaking about the reasons agents have to refrain from infringing upon people’s rational 
wills, he claims that “since these reasons to act have their source in the value of particular 
people, ...they’re reasons to act which don’t derive from...reasons for preferring some outcomes 
to others” (2021, 749). But this reasoning is fallacious. From the fact that A ultimately derives 
from (and, thus, has its source in) C, it doesn’t follow that A doesn’t derive from B. For it could 
be that A derives from B, which in turn derives from C. Indeed, that’s how it is on 
Kantsequentialism. The ultimate source of the constraint against treating people as mere means 
is the value that people have. And, from this value, the Kantsequentialist derives a duty to 
respect them and their rational choices. In turn, the Kantsequentialist derives from this duty to 
respect people a duty to adopt the end of not treating them as mere means.32 And, since 
                                                      
31 See Samuel Kerstein (2013) for other cases that make trouble for Kant’s claim that people have incomparable 
worth. Admittedly, Kerstein believes that, despite these cases, he needs to hold on to the idea that people have 
incomparable worth to avoid other counterintuitive implications (2013, 125–127), but this, I believe, is only because 
he fails to see the possibility of a view like Kantsequentialism.   
32 From the fact that people have a certain kind of goodness, it follows that it’s right to respect them. From the fact 
that it’s right to respect them, it follows that it’s right to adopt not treating them as mere means as an end. And, from 
the fact that it’s right to adopt not treating them as mere means as an end, it follows that, other things being equal, 
the prospect of my doing something that risks treating someone as a mere means ranks lower, evaluative speaking, 
than the prospect of my doing something that doesn’t have that risk. So, does the right have priority over the good, or 
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Kantsequentialism gives this end general and non-lexical priority over other ends, we get a 
constraint against treating people as mere means. But the ultimate sources of this constraint is 
the value and status of persons as ends-in-themselves. It’s just that Kantsequentialism both 
denies that this status is an inviolable one of incomparable worth and holds that the derivation 
of the constraint against treating people as mere means from their status as ends-in-themselves 
proceeds via an intermediary duty to perform the act whose prospect you ought to prefer to 
those of the alternatives.     
Of course, Howard would object to this intermediary duty on the grounds that it’s “self-
indulgent” in that “it appeals ultimately to a self-centered preference to keep your own hands 
clean” (2021, 246). But this too is a mistake. In accounting for the constraint against harming 
people as mere means, Kantsequentialism does not appeal to a preference to keep your own 
hands clean (or even as clean as possible), but rather only to a preference for not treating people 
as mere means—even as a mere means to minimizing the instances in which you’ve harmed 
people as mere means. To illustrate, consider The Antidote.33 You and Yasmin each have a vial 
with two cubic centimeters (cm3) of slow-acting poison. Although 1 cm3 is enough to kill a 
person, you give Valentino all 2 cm3. Yasmin, by contrast, gives 1 cm3 to Vladimir and 1 cm3 to 
Vasily. Shortly afterwards, you are given a vial containing 2 cm3 of the only available antidote. It 
takes an equal amount of this antidote to counteract any given amount of poison. So, you 
presently have the following choice. You can prevent yourself from becoming the murderer of 
one by giving all 2 cm3 of the antidote to Valentino or you can prevent Yasmin from becoming 
the murderer of two by giving 1 cm3 of the antidote to each of Vladimir and Vasily.  
Now, if Kantsequentialism insisted on your having a preference for clean (or cleaner) 
hands, then it would have to hold that you are required to give all 2 cm3 of the antidote to 
Valentino. But Kantsequentialism should instead hold that agents ought to prefer saving two 
people to preventing themselves from being the murderer of someone they have already treated 
                                                      
vice versa? Clearly, there’s no straightforward answer just as there would be no straightforward answer if acts were 
right because they produced good outcomes but outcomes were good because it was right to desire them.     
33 I borrow this sort of case from Emet (2010, 4).   
 29 
as a mere means. It’s important to note, then, that although there is on Kantsequentialism a 
constraint against treating someone as a mere means, you are not in The Antidote facing the 
possibility of infringing upon that constraint. You’ve already used Valentino as a mere means 
when you injected him with the poison. And there’s nothing that you can do now to change 
that. All you can do at this point is determine both how many people will die and how many 
murders you will have committed. But there’s absolutely no reason why Kantsequentialism 
can’t give priority to the end of minimizing deaths over minimizing the murders that you’ve 
committed. Indeed, Kantsequentialism doesn’t even have to give you the end of minimizing the 
murders you’ve committed. So, despite what Howard’s claims imply, there needn’t be anything 
self-centered or self-indulgent about Kantsequentialism’s account of constraints.   
 4.2 Some claim that the teleological approach has counterintuitive implications in intra-agent 
minimizing cases: Whereas an inter-agent minimizing case is one where the agent infringes upon 
a constraint to prevent more numerous others from infringing upon that same constraint, an 
intra-agent minimizing case is one where the agent infringes upon a constraint to minimize their 
own infringements of that constraint. Several philosophers (e.g., Brook 1991, Kamm 1996, and 
Otsuka 2011) have argued that consequentialist views such as ARC have counterintuitive 
implications in intra-agent minimizing cases. In all their examples, the agent has already treated 
several people as mere means but can now prevent this treatment from resulting in their being 
harmed by treating yet another person as a mere means to preventing this harm. These 
philosophers then assume that the relevant constraint prohibits harming people rather than 
treating them as mere means. And, so, they conclude that since it is impermissible to harm this 
other person as a mere means to preventing one’s previous actions from causing harm to those 
one has already treated as mere means, the rationale for the constraint can’t be agent-focused in 
the way that ARC seems to suggest.34  
To take just one representative example, consider Frances Kamm’s Guilty Agent Case: “an 
agent has set a bomb that will kill five people unless he himself now shoots one other person 
                                                      
34 See Richard Brook’s case of tossing children into the lion’s den (1991, 197), Frances Kamm’s “Guilty Agent Case” 
(1996, 242), and Michael Otsuka’s case of the dislodged boulder (2011, 43).   
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and places that person’s body over the bomb” (1996, 242). Kamm notes that it’s counterintuitive 
to suppose that the agent is permitted to shoot this other person and place his body over the 
bomb to save the five. But Kamm claims that insofar the consequentialist prohibits us from 
killing one even to prevent five others from killing only because we would then stand in a 
particular relationship to the one, a relationship in which we would not stand to the five, the 
consequentialist should permit us to shoot this other single person. For she claims that “the 
agent will stand in that same problematic relationship to the five people, if he does not kill the 
single person” (1996, 242). But this assumes that the problematic relationship is that of ‘being 
one who has killed them’ rather than that of ‘being one who has treated them as a mere means’. 
For if it’s the latter, then, contrary to Kamm’s assertion, the agent doesn’t stand in that same 
problematic relationship to the five people as he does to the one. With respect to the five, he 
doesn’t face the choice of whether to treat them as mere means, for he has already done that and 
nothing he can do now can change that.35 By contrast, with respect to the one, he does face the 
choice of whether to treat them as a mere means to preventing himself from being the murderer 
of the five. But, on Kantsequentialism, the end of minimizing the instances in which one treats a 
person as a mere means has priority over other ends, such as that of minimizing the murders 
one has committed.36 Thus, contrary to what philosophers such as Brook, Kamm, and Otsuka 
suggest, Kantsequentialism implies that agents should not harm the additional person as a 
                                                      
35 I’m assuming, here, that even if the bomb doesn’t go off such that the subjective experiences of the five are left 
completely unaffected, the five were still treated as mere means even if they weren’t used as mere means. Recall that 
you treat someone as a means if you behave toward them in a certain way for the sake of realizing some end, 
intending the presence or participation of some aspect of them to contribute to that end’s realization. Thus, the 
presence or participation of some aspect of them needn’t actually contribute to that end’s realization. What’s more, 
whether they were treated as mere means seems morally relevant over and above whether this results in their being 
used as mere means. After all, our fundamental duty toward persons is to respect them, and treating them as mere 
means is sufficient to violate this duty.    
36 The end of minimizing the instances in which one treats a person as a mere means is a time-neutral one—that is, 
one that is to be held at all times. It’s just that, after the guilty agent has already treated the five as a mere means by 
planting bomb, the only way for him at this point to minimize the instances in which he treats a person as a mere 
means is to refrain from treating the sixth person as a mere means by refraining from throwing that person’s body 
over the bomb.    
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means to preventing harm from coming to those who they have already been treated as mere 
means.  
In any case, if we want to test whether the rationale for constraints is victim-focused or 
agent-focused, we need to look at intra-agent minimizing cases in which the agent hasn’t 
already treated people as mere means. Consider, then, the following such case.   
 
Intra-Agent Promise-Breaking: “Three people in Joe’s community, Mark, Bill, and Frank, 
are planning to move over a one week period. Joe has promised each of them that he 
would help them move. When the time comes to do so, Joe realizes that he cannot keep 
his promises to all three. He can either keep his promise to Mark and break his promises 
to Bill and Frank, or he can keep his promises to Bill and Frank and break his promise to 
Mark.” (Lopez et al. 2009, 310)37 
 
Intuitively, it seems that Joe should break his promise to Mark so that he can keep his 
promises to Bill and Frank. Yet, when we consider the inter-agent analogue of this case, where 
Joe must decide whether to break his promise to Mark so that some other agent, David, can 
keep his promises to Bill and Frank, we get the opposite intuition: Joe should not break his 
promise to Mark so that David can keep his promises to Bill and Frank.38 This makes sense only 
if we adopt Kantsequentialism and take agents to be obligated both to adopt the end of 
minimizing their own promise-breakings and to give this end priority over that of preventing 
                                                      
37 Another sort of case that we might look at is one where the only way to prevent oneself from treating more 
numerous people as mere means in the future is to treat one person as a mere means now. The problem is that it’s 
very difficult, if not impossible, to come up with such a case where all the instances of treating as mere means are 
equally free such that they are morally comparable. For discussions of this issue, see Sturgeon 1996 and Portmore 
1998. There are also cases where if you were to refrain from treating X as a mere means today, you would then as a 
matter fact treat both Y and Z as mere means tomorrow, but you could refrain from treating X as a mere means today 
and then refrain from treating either Y or Z as mere means tomorrow. In this sort of case, I think that you should 
refrain from treating X as a mere means today because this is entailed by your best option: treating none of X, Y, or Z 
as mere means. For more on this, see Portmore 2019.       
38 See Lopez et al. 2009.   
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others from breaking their promises. Thus, on Kantsequentialism, the rationale for why Joe is 
permitted to break his promise to Mark to prevent himself from breaking his promises to Bill and 
Frank but is prohibited from breaking his promise to Mark to prevent David from breaking his 
promises to Bill and Frank is, as Bernard Williams (1973, 93–100) has argued, that agents have a 
special responsibility for their own actions (and promises), a responsibility that they don’t have 
for the actions (or promises) of others. And this is clearly an agent-focused rationale. Now, if, 
instead, we thought that the rationale was the victim-focused one that lies with the inviolability 
of persons, then we must instead hold (counterintuitively) that Joe is prohibited from breaking 
his promise to Mark even to prevent himself from having to break more promises in the 
future.39  
Thus, it seems that despite what Brook, Kamm, and Otsuka claim, it’s the side-constraint 
approach, not the teleological approach, that has counterintuitive implications in intra-agent 
minimizing cases. They were led to the wrong conclusion because they were looking only at 
cases where the agent had already treated several people as mere means and were wrongly 
assuming that the relevant constraint must be the one that prohibits harming as opposed to the 
one that prohibits treating people as mere means.  
 
5. Conclusion  
I’ve argued that when we consequentialize constraints by adopting ARC and combining it with 
a Kantian theory of value, we arrive at a theory—viz., Kantsequentialism—that has several 
advantages over the standard side-constraint approach, and it’s one that has no clear 
disadvantages. If this is right, then, surprisingly, constraints are more plausibly accommodated 
within a consequentialist framework than within a side-constraint framework, and this is so 
despite most side-constraint theorists thinking that constraints pose a serious problem for 
                                                      
39 And we would have to accept this same counterintuitive verdict if we were to hold, as Dougherty 2013 and Setiya 
2018 do, that agents are required both to have the end of minimizing promise-breakings-committed-in-order-to-
prevent-other-promise-breakings and t0 give this end priority over that of minimizing promise-breakings overall.  
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